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Abstract
In this paper, we remove one serious drawback of the IAB employment sample
impeding its applicability to the estimation of earnings frontiers: the censoring of
the income data, by multiple imputation. Then, we estimate individual potential
income with stochastic earnings frontiers, and we measure overeducation as the ra-
tio between actual income and potential income. It is shown that the measurement
of overeducation by this income ratio is a valuable addition to the overeducation lit-
erature because the well-established objective or subjective overeducation measures
focus on some ordinal matching aspects and ignore the metric income and efficiency
aspects of overeducation.
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1 Introduction: Measuring overeducation
Employees are called overeducated if the knowledge they have acquired in the education
process cannot be fully applied in their present jobs. The overeducation problem is im-
portant because it stands for inefficient use of individual and social resources, i.e., for
superfluous individual and social costs. It is insufficient to restrict the attention to the
question if individuals are employed or unemployed. Many studies have shown that the
amount of overeducation is considerable in many OECD countries. See Bu¨chel et al. (2003)
for a good introduction to this field of research.
In the analysis of overeducation, many papers concentrate on the economical under-
standing of the problem and on its descriptive analysis. But another problem is how to
measure overeducation. Borghans and de Grip (2000, p. 13ff) and Jensen (2003) give
introductions to the measures that dominate the literature:
1. For the objective measure, professional job analysts try to specify the required
level and type of education in particular occupations and, by this means, provide
a classification of occupations into a requirement ranking of, say, 6 or 7 classes.
These classifications are then converted to years of requested schooling or schooling
dummies which can be compared with the acquired schooling of the individuals in
the study.
2. The subjective measure is based on worker’s self-assessment. Workers are asked
how much formal education is required to get a job like theirs. Once again, this
(classified) information is compared with the actual schooling of the individual.
3. The empirical measure uses the distribution of schooling years in a given occupation
or a group of occupations. Typically, individuals are defined to be overeducated
if their schooling level is more than 1 standard deviation above the mean of all
individuals in that occupation.
Of course, different overeducation measures can lead to different results for the same
individual – and all measures can be criticized:
1. The objective measure, for example, ignores within-occupation variation in job-
specific schooling requirements. Furthermore, providing objective measures with a
sufficiently detailed partition into different occupations and accounting for occupa-
tional requirement changes over time is extremely expensive (Borghans and de Grip,
2000, p. 15). From a statistical view, one should add that converting metric infor-
mation (on schooling requirements) into few classes may destroy much information.
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2. Employees may be inclined to over- or understate the educational requirements of
their job. This leads to biased subjective measures (Borghans and de Grip, 2000,
p. 16). Furthermore – see the previous item – classifying metric information into
few classes usually leads to a loss of information.
3. The empirical measure produces results which depend heavily and arbitrarily on the
choice of the cut-off point (Borghans and de Grip, 2000, p. 16). Furthermore, this
method will always identify overeducation even if it does not exist, a well-known
problem of corresponding poverty measures.
Finally, all overeducation measures ignore the income aspect of overeducation. That
is why Jensen (2001a) presented a 4th way of measuring overeducation, the income ratio
measure: individual potential income is estimated with a stochastic earnings frontier.
Then, overeducation (= ‘income inefficiency’) is measured as the income ratio between
actual income and potential income.
Applying individual income differentials as overeducation criterion is sometimes criti-
cized because, for example, a bachelor of science working as car dealer with a considerable
income will not be identified as overeducated (Bu¨chel, 2001). The counter-argument is:
from an individual and from a social perspective, it is at least questionable if a bachelor
of science is more adequately employed if he works at a university in a temporary part-
time job with a minor income. Following human capital theory, income maximization
is an important goal of investments in schooling. And the income ratio measure allows
the inclusion of the (metric) income and efficiency aspects of overeducation ignored by
the well-established objective or subjective measures focusing on some (ordinal) matching
aspects.
But the 2-step approach used in Jensen (2001a) has been criticized in the production
frontier literature where it is originated. Therefore, Jensen (2003) improved the income
ratio approach by introducing the inefficiency effects specification by Reifschneider and
Stevenson (1991) to the overeducation literature. Here, overeducation can be modeled
as a function of several overeducation determinants while the main model describes the
dependence of potential income on determinants (like human capital) of individual income.
But the results of that paper are unsatisfactory due to the small sample size of the data
set (German Socioeconomic Panel, GSOEP) used in that study.
The IAB employment sample is a much larger data set for modeling individual income
and overeducation (IAB stands for ‘Institute for Employment Research of the Federal
Employment Agency’ (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagen-
tur fu¨r Arbeit)). But the income data in this data set are censored in the upper tails.
When estimating average earnings functions, this problem is typically solved by applying
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Tobit models. But the estimation of an earnings frontier – trying to estimate individual
overeducation (= ‘income inefficiency’) with respect to maximum potential income – is
immensely impeded.
In this paper, we will therefore multiply impute the censored income data in order to
be able to estimate individual overeducation with the large IAB employment sample. The
contribution of this paper to the literature is two-fold: We show that the income ratio
approach for measuring overeducation works excellently when applied to a sufficiently
large data set. And we show how the censored income data of the IAB employment
sample can be imputed to estimate earnings (frontier) functions.
The reminder of this article is as follows: The following section summarizes the nec-
essary details on earnings frontiers and their econometric origin, namely production fron-
tiers. After an overview on the IAB employment sample in section 3, a short introduction
to multiple imputation is provided in section 4. The subsequent section presents and
discusses the estimation results in detail. Some conclusions close the paper.
2 Stochastic earnings frontiers
This section summarizes the theory on stochastic earnings frontiers necessary in the fol-
lowing.
2.1 Production frontiers
In microeconomic theory, production functions provide maximum possible output for
given inputs of, say, n firms in the sample. In reality, inefficient input use may lead
to lower outputs for many firms. That is why frontier functions (lying on top of the
data cloud) have been developed for estimating potential output and inefficiency. See
the surveys in Coelli et al. (1998), Greene (1997) or Jensen (2001a) for more details on
frontiers.
Based on the seminal work of Aigner and Chu (1968), Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen
and van den Broeck (1977) introduced the stochastic production frontier
Yi = e
β0 ·
k∏
j=1
X
βj
ij · evi · TEi, i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
or in logs
yi = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βjxij + εi, εi = vi − ui, ui ≥ 0. (2)
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Here, yi is the output (in logs), xij are k inputs (all in logs) of firm no. i, and βj are
unknown parameters. Then, with TEi = 1,
Y ∗i = e
β0 ·
k∏
j=1
X
βj
ij · evi (3)
or in logs with ui = 0
y∗i = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βjxij + vi (4)
is maximum possible output (in logs) for given inputs. The output ratio
0 ≤ TEi = e−ui = Yi
Y ∗i
≤ 1 (5)
is interpreted as technical inefficiency of firm no. i. Finally, the composed error term
εi consists of the one-sided inefficiency term ui and the symmetric part vi representing
statistical noise. xij, vi, and ui are assumed to be independent with the distributional
assumptions
vi ∼ N(0, σ2v) and ui ∼ trunc0N(µ, σ2u) (6)
where trunc0N(·, ·) stands for a normal distribution truncated at u = 0 (see Stevenson,
1980).
The choice of the truncated normal distribution in (6) contains the half-normal distri-
bution as (testable) special case. Other tractable alternatives for the inefficiency distribu-
tion are the exponential and the gamma distribution. Ritter and Simar (1997) have shown
the bad performance of the gamma distribution. Jensen (2005) has presented some risks
of working with exponentially distributed inefficiency. Therefore, we prefer the truncated
normal distribution.
The log-likelihood function is given by l(β, σ, λ, µ) =
−n
[
ln(σ) + const+ ln
(
Φ
(−µ
σλ
))]
−
n∑
i=1
[
1
2
(εi
σ
)2
− ln
(
Φ
(−µ
σλ
− −εiλ
σ
))]
(7)
with
λ =
σu
σv
and σ2 = σ2v + σ
2
u (8)
and the cumulative standard normal distribution function Φ(·). Iterative maximization
leads to consistent and asymptotically efficient maximum likelihood (ML) estimators βˆj,
σˆ, λˆ, and µˆ.
How can the inefficiency terms be estimated? Since, in a stochastic frontier model,
the estimation residuals only estimate the composed error ε and not u, the inefficiencies
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must be estimated indirectly, for example with the help of the minimum mean-squared
error predictor
E[ui|εi] = σλ
1 + λ2
(
φ
(
εiλ
σ
)
Φ
(− εiλ
σ
) − εiλ
σ
)
(9)
with the standard normal density function φ(·).
This basic approach might be too restrictive. Independence of xij and ui may be a
hard assumption as heteroscedasticity might occur. Despite the iid assumption (6), u
might still contain some structure. Until the beginning of this decade, the so-called ‘2-
step approach’ has been employed quite often: the inefficiency estimates from (9) – the
first step – were used to find some inefficiency determinants in a second step. But Wang
and Schmidt (2002) have shown that this procedure – claiming that ui are iid in the first
step and finding structure in them in the second step – can lead to severely biased results.
Therefore, it is advisable to use the procedure already presented by Reifschneider and
Stevenson (1991). They allow the inefficiency terms ui to depend on some explanatory
variables zij (interpreted as sources of inefficiency) which may be partly identical with
variables xij:
ui = δ0 +
l∑
j=1
δjzij + wi = di + wi, i = 1, . . . , n, (10)
δj are unknown parameters. The distributional assumptions are
vi ∼ N(0, σ2v), ui ∼ trunc0N(di, σ2u), and wi ∼ trunc−diN(0, σ2u). (11)
The ML estimators βˆj, δˆj, σˆ and λˆ are derived simultaneously using iterative ML tech-
niques. See the given references for the likelihood function of the full model.
2.2 Earnings frontiers
The ideas and models presented in the previous subsection now are transferred to the
estimation of an earnings frontier in a rather straightforward way: transforming schooling
investments (input) to earnings (output) is also a production process which should be
performed as efficient as possible.
The earnings frontier model is based on the popular human capital model by Mincer
(1974) for explaining individual income. However, the rigid assumptions of the basic
human capital model have often been criticized for good reasons. In contrast to these
assumptions,
• labor markets and education markets are far from perfect.
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• higher education is not necessarily identical to higher productivity, and the latter
does not automatically imply higher wages: much knowledge learned at school or
at the university does not come into adequate use in jobs. Applicants with iden-
tical human capital stock may have substantial productivity differences in a given
job. And apparently identical occupations can differ considerably regarding their
productivity requirements and wages.
• employees and employers are not perfectly informed about all labor market aspects
relevant to them: partly considerable information deficits exist on both sides, in-
stead. Employers often are not sufficiently informed about the productivity of their
employees. And if they are informed, they may be not able to allocate the abilities
of their employees to the jobs available in the firm. For employees, an efficient job
search leads to direct and indirect costs. Therefore, it is rational to stop the search
if a wage offer exceeds a certain reservation wage.
These and many other restrictions to the basic human capital model have led to
many extensions like screening theory, search theory, etc. The earnings frontier approach
accounts for these restrictions by transferring the inefficiency aspect from production
frontiers to earnings frontiers.
In Daneshvary et al. (1992), individual wages LINC (in logs) are assumed to depend
on personal characteristics H augmenting human capital stock, job characteristics C and
information I on labor market conditions, the wage distribution, and job search methods.
Individuals stop their search when a wage offer exceeds the reservation wage LINCr. For
any set of H and C and perfect information I∗, a potential maximum attainable wage
LINC∗ exists. Therefore, LINC = LINC(H,C, I) is estimated as stochastic earnings
frontier (see the production frontier (2))
LINCi = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βjxij + εi, εi = vi − ui, ui ≥ 0 (12)
The explanatory variables x will be introduced in the following section.
Then,
LINC∗i = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βjxij + vi (13)
(see (4)) is maximum possible (potential) income. With untransformed individual income
INCi, Jensen (2001a) interprets the inefficiency terms
0 ≤ OVERi = 1− e−ui = 1− INCi
INC∗i
≤ 1 (14)
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(instead of (5)) as cost of imperfect information measuring the overeducation of individual
number i as income ratio. Note that parametrization (14) is different from (5). Jensen
(2003) uses the inefficiency effects specification (10) as overeducation effects specification
to model overeducation as a function of several determinants. vi represents statistical
noise as in the previous subsection.
For interpreting parameter values, the untransformed stochastic earnings frontier
INCi = e
β0 ·
k∏
j=1
X
βj
ij · evi · (1−OVERi) (15)
(instead of (1)) is preferred. All further remarks of the previous subsection concerning
modeling and estimation of u, model assumptions, etc. apply likewise.
Jensen (2001a and 2001b) discusses the advantages of the earnings frontier over the
‘average earnings function’. The frontier model includes the important but hardly measur-
able human capital investment ‘search for information’. An average human capital model
only explains potential income sufficiently but individuals do not obtain their maximum
possible income because of imperfect information described above. The usual OLS ap-
proach does not take into account the considerable amount of individual inefficiency in
finding the suitable jobs and therefore falsely interprets inefficiency (overeducation) as
misspecification.
3 Data and the censoring
Many studies about wage structure in Germany use the IAB employment sample (IABS).
But up to now, it was not possible to estimate earnings frontiers. The IABS is a 2 percent
random sample of all employees covered by the social security system. Accordingly self-
employed, family workers, and civil servants (Beamte) are not included. The data set
represents about 80 percent of the employees in Germany. A detailed description of the
data can be found in Bender et al. (2000) or Hamann et al. (2004).
The data are drawn from the Employment Register of the Federal Employment Agency.
Employers are obliged to report at least once a year the earnings and other information
about their employees. Therefore, the data are highly reliable. The IABS includes, among
others, information about age, sex, education, wages, and the occupational group.
Since contributions to the social security system must be payed only up to a contribu-
tion limit, the wages are reported only up to this limit. Thus, the wages are right-censored.
For employees payed above the limit, only the limit is reported. Our solution for this data
problem is discussed below.
The data set includes about one million employment spells for each year. For our
study, we impose several restrictions on the data: Only employment spells valid at June
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30, 2001 are included. We exclude part-time workers and apprentices. Part-time workers
are excluded because the wages are given as daily wages and the hours worked per day are
unknown. Therefore, we compare only fulltime workers. Furthermore, we have dropped
all cases where earnings are below twice the limit of minor employment because these
wages are implausible for fulltime workers. We restrict our data to West German male
residents at the age of 18 to 55 years. With these restrictions, the data set contains
165,425 observations with 27,104 (16.4%) censored wages.
The variables used for the earnings frontier model and the imputation procedure are
defined as follows: Potential experience (linear, quadratic and cubic) is calculated as
age minus six minus years of schooling. Tenure (linear, quadratic and cubic) are the
cumulated years a person works in the firm. The educational levels are: no qualification,
vocational training, Abitur (higher secondary school), Abitur with vocational training,
technical college, and university. The job-status is separated to four categories: unskilled
worker, craftsman, master craftsman, and white collar worker. Additionally, we use an
occupational classification scheme to define 11 occupational groups according to Blossfeld
(1985). The occupations are grouped by hierarchical levels in the firm and by main
economic sectors. To control for the economic environment we include further dummy
variables for 9 categories of firm size, for 15 industrial categories (aggregated from the
wz73 code), and for 8 regional types. The definition of the regional types can be found
in the appendix in table 4.
4 Multiple imputation
To allow the estimation of earnings frontier functions with these data, we treat the cen-
soring of wages as a missing data problem. In this special case, we regard the missingness
mechanism as ‘not missing at random’ (NMAR, according to Little and Rubin, 1987,
2002) as well as ‘missing by design’, because the missingness depends on the value itself,
i.e., if the wage exceeds the limit, the true value will not be reported but the limit, say
a. A common approach to handle missing data is multiple imputation which means that
every missing value is randomly imputed for m times (see Rubin 1978, 1987, 1996). In
our case, the missing value is the wage whenever the limit is reported.
To start with, let Y = (Yobs, Ymis) denote the random variables concerning the data
with observed and missing parts. In our specific situation this means that for all units
with wages below the limit a each data record is complete, i.e., Y = (Yobs) = (X,wages).
For every unit with a value of the limit a for its wage information we treat the data record
as partly missing, i.e., Y = (Yobs, Ymis) = (X, ?). Thus, we have to multiply impute the
missing data Ymis = wage if wage = a.
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4.1 The basic principle
The theory and principle of multiple imputation (MI) originates from Rubin (1978). The
theoretical motivation for multiple imputation is Bayesian, although the resulting multiple
imputation inference is usually also valid from a frequentist viewpoint. Basically, MI
requires independent random draws from the posterior predictive distribution fYmis|Yobs of
the missing data given the observed data. Since it is often difficult to draw from fYmis|Yobs
directly, a two-step procedure for each of the m draws is useful:
(a) First, we make random draws of the parameters Ξ according to their observed-data
posterior distribution fΞ|Yobs ,
(b) then, we perform random draws of Ymis according to their conditional predictive
distribution fYmis|Yobs,Ξ.
Because
fYmis|Yobs(ymis|yobs) =
∫
fYmis|Yobs,Ξ(ymis|yobs, ξ)fΞ|Yobs(ξ|yobs)dξ (16)
holds, with (a) and (b) we achieve imputations of Ymis from their posterior predictive
distribution fYmis|Yobs . Due to the data generating model used, for many models the
conditional predictive distribution fYmis|Yobs,Ξ is rather straightforward.
In contrast, the corresponding observed-data posteriors fΞ|Yobs usually are difficult to
derive for those units with missing data, especially when the data have a multivariate
structure and different missing data patterns. The observed-data posteriors are often no
standard distributions from which random numbers can easily be generated. However,
simpler methods have been developed to enable multiple imputation based on Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques (extensively discussed by Schafer, 1997). In
MCMC, the desired distributions fYmis|Yobs and fΞ|Yobs are achieved as stationary distri-
butions of Markov chains which are based on the complete-data distributions which are
easier to compute.
To proceed further, let θ denote a scalar quantity of interest that is to be estimated,
such as a mean, variance, or correlation coefficient. Notice that now θ can be completely
different from the data model used before to create the imputations. Although θ could be
an explicit function of the parameters ξ of the imputation model one of the strengths of
the multiple imputation approach is that this need not be the case. In fact, θ = ξ is called
congenial (Meng, 1994). However, multiple imputation is designed for situations where
the analyst and the imputer are different, thus, the analyst’s model could be quite different
from the imputer’s model. As long as the two models are not overly incompatible or the
fraction of missing information is not high, inferences based on the multiply imputed data
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should still be approximately valid. Moreover, if the analyst’s model is a sub-model of
the imputer’s model, i.e., the imputer uses a larger set of covariates than the analyst and
the covariates are good predictors of the missing values, then MI inference is superior to
the best inference possible using only the variables in the analyst’s model. This property
is called superefficiency by Rubin (1996). On the other hand, if the imputer ignores some
important correlates of variables with missing data, but these variables are used in the
analyst’s model, then the results will be biased. To account for uncongeniality we use the
same variables in the imputation model as in the earnings frontiers model.
Now let θ̂ = θ̂(Y ) denote the statistic that would be used to estimate θ if the data
were complete. Furthermore, let v̂ar(θ̂) = v̂ar(θ̂(Y )) be the variance estimate of θ̂(Y )
based on the complete data set.
We also assume that with complete data, usually tests and interval estimates which
are based on the normal approximation
θ̂ − θ√
v̂ar(θ̂)
∼ N(0, 1) (17)
should work well.
Notice that the usual maximum-likelihood estimates and their asymptotic variances
derived from the inverted Fisher information matrix typically satisfy these assumptions.
Suppose now that the data are missing and we make m > 1 independent simulated
imputations (Yobs, Y
(1)
mis), (Yobs, Y
(2)
mis), . . . , (Yobs, Y
(m)
mis ) enabling us to calculate the im-
puted data estimate θ̂(t) = θ̂(Yobs, Y
(t)
mis) along with its estimated variance v̂ar(θ̂
(t)) =
v̂ar(θ̂(Yobs, Y
(t)
mis)), t = 1, 2, . . . ,m. From these m imputed data sets the multiple imputa-
tion estimates are computed.
The MI point estimate for θ is simply the average
θ̂MI =
1
m
m∑
t=1
θ̂(t). (18)
To obtain a standard error
√
v̂ar(θ̂MI) for the MI estimate θ̂MI , we first calculate the
‘between-imputation’ variance
v̂ar(θ̂)between = B =
1
m− 1
m∑
t=1
(θ̂(t) − θ̂MI)2, (19)
and then the ‘within-imputation’ variance
v̂ar(θ̂)within = W =
1
m
m∑
t=1
v̂ar(θ̂(t)) . (20)
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Finally, the estimated total variance is defined by
v̂ar(θ̂MI) = T = v̂ar(θ̂)within +
(
1 +
1
m
)
v̂ar(θ̂)between
= W +
m+ 1
m
B. (21)
The term ((m + 1)/m)B enlarges the total variance estimate T compared to the usual
analysis of variance with T = B + W ; (m + 1)/m is an adjustment for finite m. An
estimate of the fraction of missing information γ about θ due to non-response is given by
γ̂ =
(1 + 1/m)B
T
. (22)
For large sample sizes, tests and two-sided (1−α)100% interval estimates can be based
on the Student’s t-distribution
θ̂MI − θ√
T
∼ tv and θ̂MI ± tv,1−α/2
√
T (23)
with the degrees of freedom
v = (m− 1)
(
1 +
W
(1 +m−1)B
)2
. (24)
From (23) we can see that the multiple imputation interval estimate is expected to produce
a larger interval than an estimate based only on one single imputation (SI). The multiple
imputation interval estimates are widened to account for the missing data uncertainty
and simulation error. Using only one singly imputed data set, in general, will lead to an
underestimation of uncertainty and thus produce variance estimates that are too low and
p-values that are too significant.
4.2 Imputation model
To adopt the multiple imputation principle for solving the problem of censored wages we
assume that for person i the wage in logs is given by
y∗i = x
′
iβ + ²i (25)
where ²
iid∼ N(0, τ−2).
We observe the wage yobs = y
∗
i only if the wage is under the threshold a. If the wage
is above a, we observe a instead of y∗i :
yi =
{
yobs if y
∗
i ≤ a
a if y∗i > a
, (26)
11
thus yi is right censored. We now impute for a itself estimations z of the true wages.
Thus, we define y = (yobs, a) and yz = (yobs, z). Then, z is a truncated variable in the
range (a,∞) and its conditional predictive distribution is given by
f(z|y, β, τ 2) = fN(z|x
′β, τ−2)
1− Φ(τa− τx′β) (27)
where a < z <∞. According to Chib (1992) we get a data augmentation algorithm and
Gibbs sampler based on the full conditional distributions:
f(β|y, z, τ 2) = fN(β|βˆz, τ−2(X ′X)−1) (28)
f(τ 2|y, z, β) = fG(τ 2|n/2,
n∑
i=1
(yz − x′β)2/2) (29)
where β̂
(t)
z = (X ′X)−1X ′y
(t)
z is the usual OLS estimate based on the complete data set.
To receive valid imputations and random draws of the parameters from their observed
data distribution in accordance with the rule presented in (16), we finally propose a
MCMC technique as mentioned earlier. To start the chain we take the starting values
β(0), τ 2(0) from a conditional ML Tobit estimation.
Imputation-step:
First, we randomly draw values for the missing variables from the truncated distribu-
tion according to (28), that is
z
(t)
i ∼ truncaN(x′iβ(t), τ−2(t)). (30)
Note that alternatively an accept-rejection algorithm could be applied instead of draw-
ing directly from the truncated distribution. But the computational time gets too large
with such an amount of missing data and these large data sets. More details on the
algorithm used can be found in Gartner and Ra¨ssler (2005).
Second, we compute an OLS regression based on the imputed data sets, resulting in
the estimator:
β̂(t)z = (X
′X)−1X ′y(t)z . (31)
Then we produce new random draws for the parameters according to their complete
data posterior distribution. To run random drawings of τ with STATA we would need the
inverse of a gamma distribution. Because this is complicated we use a slight modification
of (29).
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Posterior-step:
In the posterior-step we draw first τ 2(t+1) according to
g ∼ χ2(n− k) (32)
τ 2(t+1) =
g
RSS
(33)
where
RSS =
n∑
i=1
(
y(t)zi − x′iβ̂(t)z
)2
(34)
is the residual sum of squares, and k is the number of columns of X.
Then we draw β(t+1):
β(t+1) ∼ N
(
β̂(t)z , τ
−2(t+1)(X ′X)−1
)
. (35)
The covariates contained in X are the same as in the wage regression. We repeat the
imputation-step and the posterior-step 11,000 times and storage the values z
(2,000)
i , z
(3,000)
i ,
... , z
(11,000)
i to obtain 10 different completed data sets. The imputation routine required
a completion time of about six hours. Different analyses of the convergence of the chains
did not exhibit any problems.
We have assumed a log-normal distribution of the wages. But the normal distribution
is notoriously sensitive to outliers (see Gelman et al., 2003, p. 443). Especially by using
transformations of a normal distribution this problem may be considerable (as discussed
by Rubin, 1983). To examine the applicability of our distribution assumption, Gartner and
Ra¨ssler (2005) compare the distribution of imputed wages with the distribution calculated
with the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) and find that the imputed wages lie
about in the same range as the wages in the GSOEP.
Since the distribution of the imputed wages seems plausible, the data set is used to
estimate the earnings frontier model.
5 Estimation results
Descriptive statistics of the variables used to estimate the stochastic earnings frontier
(12) with overeducation effects submodel (10) are given in the appendix in table 1. The
estimation has been performed with LIMDEP 8.0.
Table 2 in the appendix provides the estimation results for the stochastic earnings
frontier (12). Signs and size of the parameter estimates are as expected. With the un-
transformed earnings frontier (15), their interpretation is straightforward. For example,
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studying successfully at a university means: multiply the potential income without qual-
ification by the factor
e0.3366·1 = 1.400, (36)
ceteris paribus and on average. Potential income (like average income) is higher
• with more experience,
• with higher tenure,
• with higher education,
• with higher status,
• in more densely populated regions,
• in larger firms.
As motivated in subsection 2.2, overeducation (= ‘income inefficiency’) is measured as
the income ratio between actual income and potential income. But the problematic part
of the previous work on the income ratio measure has been to model overeducation. The
2-step approach in Jensen (2001a) has been criticized in the production frontier literature
because it may lead to biased results. The overeducation effects specification in Jensen
(2003) gives unsatisfactory results due to the small sample size of the data set (German
Socioeconomic Panel, GSOEP) used in that study. Since essentially the same individual
and job characteristics determine (potential) earnings and overeducation, it seemed to be
impossible to find significant metric variables determining overeducation in that study.
And the parameter estimates of some makeshift dummies used instead show unexpected
signs, as for age and tenure.
The results in table 3 for the overeducation effects submodel (10) reveal the rich
information available in the large IAB employment sample (made available by multiple
imputation) and show the explanatory power of the income ratio approach when applied
to such a data set. Whereas the well-established objective or subjective overeducation
measures focus on some (ordinal) matching aspects, the income ratio measure allows the
simultaneous modeling of potential income and overeducation and reveals the (metric)
income and efficiency aspects of overeducation. Our result is that overeducation decreases
– see (14) – with more experience, higher tenure, higher education and lower status.
Since the functional forms of the relations between experience or tenure and overedu-
cation are polynomials of order 3, figures 1 and 2 in the appendix demonstrate the forms
and the sizes of these relations. Note that the model – see (11) – only guarantees ui ≥ 0.
But since there are n different individuals with n different vectors zi there is no sensibly
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defined zero for the vertical axis in these plots. Therefore, the functions are simply shifted
such that minimum overeducation is zero. The range of experience and tenure in the plots
is the same as in the data.
The cubic relation between experience and overeducation is in line with theories that
are well-known in the literature on overeducation (see Bu¨chel, 2001), viz job matching
theory and career mobility theory. Overeducation is very high at the beginning of the
working career and then decreases very fast. This can be explained by the career mobility
theory by Sicherman and Galor (1990): “Individuals may choose an entry level in which
the direct returns to schooling are lower than those in other feasible entry levels if the
effect of schooling on the probability of promotion is higher in this entry level” (p. 177).
So, young employees waive some present income in favor of a promotion option. And the
employers get the opportunity to test their young employees with reduced wages.
Job matching theory, for example in the form of Jovanovic (1979), interprets jobs as
‘experience goods’. The information I on labor market conditions, the wage distribution
and job search methods should increase with experience. And, as outlined in subsection
2.2, higher information I should lead to better matches between workers and jobs, and
lower overeducation. Figure 1 shows that this development comes to an end with an
experience of roughly 20 years. After that time, overeducation slightly increases again,
maybe due to the higher age of the workers leading to a growing difference between
experience and productivity.
Job matching theory also helps to understand the cubic relation between tenure and
overeducation: Job tenure is often simply taken as indicator for matching quality because
only sufficiently good matches between workers and jobs should endure (if reasonable
alternatives are available). Nevertheless, employees need a certain search time to find a
better match and many of them search without success, maybe due to low skills. There-
fore, individuals with higher tenure show lower overeducation. But this relation stops at
a tenure of roughly 10 years. This could mean that a considerable part of bad matches
(but better a bad match than no match) has to remain because no better alternatives are
available or because it might be a bad signal to employers – see below – when jobs are
changed too often. This phenomenon is also compatible with the segmentation theory
by Doeringer and Piore (1971) assuming that labor markets are divided into sub-markets
or segments (a primary segment with well-paid and promising jobs and a secondary pe-
ripheral segment with low-paid and unskilled jobs) with little permeability between the
segments. Interestingly, at a tenure of roughly 20 years, the tenure-overeducation-profile
starts to fall again. This might happen because, then, many bad matches are finished by
(early) retirement.
With equations (10) and (14), the interpretation of the education dummy parameter
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estimates is straightforward. For example, studying successfully at a university means a
reduction of overeducation by
(1− e−0.4830·1) · 100 = 38.3% (37)
ceteris paribus and on average. It turnes out that higher education goes in line with
lower overeducation. This can be understood with the help of other theories that are also
well-known in the literature on overeducation, viz the theories of signaling, screening and
job competition.
Following the theories of signaling (Spence, 1973) and screening (Stiglitz, 1975), em-
ployers have problems to discern the latent future productivity of their applicants. There-
fore, they screen them by taking the quality of their diploma as a signal for this latent
future productivity and some other latent desired properties (higher self-discipline and
motivation, better health, lower future training costs). Therefore, in the competition
(Thurow, 1975) for good adequate jobs, applicants with higher education are preferred
by employers. Applicants with lower education are ousted to jobs with lower require-
ments (see for example Muysken and ter Weel, 2000). Skill-biased technological change
and organizational change add to this development because they lead to an upgrading of
formerly ‘simple’ jobs with the same effect on less qualified job applicants.
The standard deviation ratio λ (see (8)) and the average overeducation of 0.2222 (see
(14)) show that a considerable amount of total variation of income is due to overeducation.
6 Conclusions
This paper has made two contributions to the literature. First, we have removed one seri-
ous drawback of the IAB employment sample impeding its applicability to the estimation
of earnings frontiers: the censoring of the income data, by multiple imputation.
Afterwards, we have shown that the income ratio approach for measuring overeduca-
tion works excellently when applied to such a sufficiently large data set. The income ratio
measure is a valuable addition to the overeducation literature because the well-established
objective or subjective overeducation measures focus on some (ordinal) matching aspects
and ignore the (metric) income and efficiency aspects of overeducation. Notice that all
previous attempts to implement the income ratio approach suffered from econometric
or data problems. This study has now provided detailed evidence on the influence of
experience, tenure, and education on overeducation.
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Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables in (12)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Variable Mean Std. dev.
ln(wage) 4.497 0.387 Type of region
Experience 20.121 8.979 Region type 1 0.316 0.465
Experience2/100 4.855 3.722 Region type 2 0.170 0.375
Experience3/1000 13.020 13.533 Region type 3 0.059 0.235
Tenure 7.726 7.383 Region type 4 0.017 0.128
Tenure2/100 1.142 1.790 Region type 5 0.075 0.263
Tenure3/1000 2.143 4.362 Region type 6 0.180 0.384
Qualification level Region type 7 0.081 0.273
No qualification 0.115 0.319 Region type 8 0.103 0.304
Vocational training 0.703 0.457
Abitur 0.009 0.096 Industry
Abitur + voc. training 0.044 0.206 Agriculture 0.006 0.080
Tech. college 0.052 0.222 Energy 0.016 0.126
University 0.076 0.264 Mining 0.007 0.081
Job status Quarrying 0.075 0.263
Unskilled worker 0.205 0.404 Machine building 0.253 0.435
Craftsman 0.324 0.468 Household goods 0.071 0.256
Master craftsman 0.028 0.164 Food 0.024 0.153
White collar worker 0.443 0.497 Construction 0.052 0.222
Size of firm Building completition 0.041 0.198
1-5 0.065 0.247 Trade 0.115 0.319
6-20 0.142 0.349 Transport/communic. 0.061 0.239
21-50 0.132 0.338 Business service 0.135 0.342
51-100 0.114 0.318 Household service 0.020 0.141
101-500 0.266 0.442 Social service 0.077 0.266
501-1,000 0.094 0.292 Public service 0.048 0.214
1,001-2,000 0.069 0.254
2,001-10,000 0.080 0.272
>10,000 0.037 0.189
Notes: 165,425 observations; own calculations, based on IABS 2001
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Table 2: Stochastic earnings frontier (12), dependent variable: ln(daily wage)
Variable Coefficient t value
Constant 4.0745 492.97
Experience/10 0.2863 24.32
Experience2/100 -0.0810 -12.78
Experience3/1000 0.0078 7.62
Tenure/10 0.0506 13.53
Tenure2/100 -0.0149 -9.90
Qualification level
Vocational training 0.0512 17.36
Abitur 0.1336 16.32
Abitur + voc. training 0.1245 21.83
Tech. college 0.2225 37.19
University 0.3366 49.85
Job status
Craftsman 0.0584 21.76
Master craftsman 0.3328 64.61
White collar worker 0.2893 61.58
Type of region
Region type 1 0.0730 27.73
Region type 2 0.0868 36.86
Region type 3 0.0391 13.06
Region type 4 0.0364 7.40
Region type 5 0.0522 13.67
Region type 6 0.0412 15.25
Region type 7 0.0138 5.13
Size of firm
1-5 -0.1338 -34.41
6-20 -0.1055 -39.86
21-50 -0.0632 -31.95
51-100 -0.0362 -12.85
501-1,000 0.0271 8.55
1,001-2,000 0.0575 15.83
2,001-10,000 0.0787 23.64
>10,000 0.1636 40.78
Industry dummies yes
Occupational dummies yes
165,425 observations
Notes: reference group is no qualification, unskilled worker, rural region, firm size
101-500; coefficients and t-values calculated according to equation (18) and (21);
own calculations, based on IABS 2001 22
Table 3: Overeducation effects submodel (10)
Variable Coefficient t value
Constant 0.0847 2.24
Experience/10 -0.6937 -11.75
Experience2/100 0.2722 9.56
Experience3/1000 -0.0332 -6.68
Tenure/10 -1.0279 -18.48
Tenure2/100 0.7108 18.50
Tenure3/1000 -0.1699 -13.56
Qualification level
Vocational training -0.2669 -21.50
Abitur + voc. training -0.3902 -16.97
Tech. college -0.4550 -17.68
University -0.4830 -20.45
Job status
Craftsman -0.1508 -9.09
Master craftsman 0.2331 7.70
White collar worker 0.1773 8.61
Region dummies yes
Firm size dummies yes
Occupational dummies yes
Industry dummies yes
λ 2.2452 74.53
u¯ 0.2512
Average overeducation 0.2222
165,425 observations
Notes: reference group is no qualification, unskilled worker; the coefficients of re-
gional and firm size dummies are not presented, because many of them are insignif-
icant; coefficients and t-values calculated according to equation (18) and (21); own
calculations, based on IABS 2001
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Table 4: Definition of regional types
Type of region Characterization
Region type 1 Core cities in regions with major agglomerations
Region type 2 Very densely populated districts in regions with major agglomerations
Region type 3 Densely populated districts in regions with major agglomerations
Region type 4 Rural structured districts in regions with major agglomerations
Region type 5 Core cities in regions with features of conurbations
Region type 6 Densely populated districts in regions with features of conurbations
Region type 7 Rural structured districts in regions with features of conurbations
Region type 8 Rural regions
24
Appendix: Figures
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Figure 1: Relation between potential experience and overeducation
Notes: Experience in years; own calculations, based on IABS 2001
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Figure 2: Relation between tenure and overeducation
Notes: Tenure in years; own calculations, based on IABS 2001
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